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In this paper we investigate the implications of labour and capital market 
imperfections for the relationship between  firm size and earnings. To 
establish that such a question is of interest we need to show that the firm 
size-wage effect cannot be explained by either the observed or unobserved 
skills of the workforce or the characteristics of the workplace. To do that we 
require data where controls are possible for observable time-varying firm 
and worker characteristics, as well as the unobservable characteristics of 
both the firm and its workers. Our data is a sample of workers matched with 
firms over time so such controls are possible. Changes in wages are shown 
to respond to changes both to profits per employee and the size of the firm. It 
is argued that these empirical results clearly reject the hypothesis that the 
firm-size relationship can be explained by the skills of the workers. They can 
be shown to be consistent with some forms of non-competitive theories of 
bargaining and efficiency wages.  
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1.   Introduction  
The human capital model, in which earnings reflect skill differentials in perfect factor markets, has 
dominated the interpretation of earnings functions. The finding that earnings rise with firm size has 
been widely interpreted in this framework. The human capital explanation is that the vector of relevant 
productive skills is partially unobserved, and that the significance of firm characteristics in earnings 
regressions essentially reflects unobserved labour quality, Oi and Idson (1999). If large firms hire 
more able individuals than do small firms, for instance, and ability is partially unobserved to the 
econometrician, then the result that firm size is positively correlated with earnings is entirely 
consistent with the standard human capital model and competitive labour markets. 
In recent years there has been a rapid development of non-competitive models of the labour 
market, specifically models of efficiency wages (see Shapiro and Stiglitz, 1984, Weiss 1980, Akerlof 
and Yellen, 1986, for theoretical rationales for the payment of efficiency wages and Dickens and Katz 
1987,  Raff and Summers 1987,  Krueger and Summers (1987, 1988), Katz and Summers 1989, 
Wadhwani and Wall 1991, Levine 1992, Moll 1993, and Huang et al 1998, for tests) and bargaining 
(see Slichter 1950, Van Reenen 1996 and Blanchflower et al 1996 for developed countries and Teal 
1996, Valenchik 1997 and Azam 2001 for developing countries).  These studies document inter-
industry or inter-firm wage differentials that are seemingly inconsistent with the competitive model, 
and some of the studies proceed by investigating whether these differentials can be linked to 
observable firm characteristics, notably profitability and monitoring costs.  
In parallel with this development of models of wage determination has been an extensive 
empirical investigation of how wages link to firm size (see Mellow 1982, Brown and Medhoff 1989, 
Troske 1999, and Bayard and Troske, 1999 for analyses based on U.S. data; see Mazumdar 1983, 
Valenchik 1997, Strobl and Thornton, 2001, Manda, 2002, and Mazumdar and Mazaheri, 2002. for 
evidence from developing countries). In the most recent and comprehensive analysis on US data, 
Troske (1999) and Bayard and Troske (1999) use matched employer-employee data to investigate 
which aspects of the theories of human capital, efficiency wages and bargaining can explain the firm 
size-wage relationship. Troske (1999) concludes that once as comprehensive an allowance as possible   2 
is made for the factors suggested by these theories “there still remains a large, significant and 
unexplained size-wage premium” (p.25).  
In this paper we explore further the implications for the size-wage premium of bargaining and 
efficiency wage models of wage determination. We extend these models to include capital constraints 
and show that such constraints can increase the size-wage premium. We draw on data from two 
African countries – Kenya and Ghana - where capital market constraints are known to be pervasive 
(see Bigsten et al 1999). To establish a causal link from size to wages we need to show that the scale 
effect cannot be removed either by factors that may be related to the unobserved quality of the 
workforce or by other aspects of the firms’ performance such as profitability and monitoring costs. 
Section 2 summarises the numerous hypotheses that have been advanced to explain the fact 
that wages rise with firm size and outlines how we propose to use our matched panel of workers with 
firms to test these alternative theories. Section 3 covers details about the data including summary 
statistics. In section 4 we investigate the effects of firm and worker characteristics on the firm size 
wage relationship allowing for fixed effects by differencing but confining our attention to OLS 
estimates. The objective in section 5 is to assess if size, and other aspects of the firm’s performance, 
can be given a causal interpretation by finding instruments that allow for the endogeneity of size and 
firm outcomes. In section 6 we ask whether either bargaining, or efficiency wage, models can explain 
the results. Section 7 provides conclusions. 
 
2.   Analytical Framework and Empirical Approach  
Our point of departure is the standard Mincerian framework stating that differences in individual log 
earnings are driven exclusively by differences in human capital,  h y + = h w ln , where h is a vector of 
observed human capital variables and h denotes a dimension of labour quality that is observable to the 
firm but unobservable to the econometrician. This will be an appropriate specification if the labour 
market is competitive, so that firms are wage-takers. We assume that the vector h consists of years of 
education, tenure, age and age squared, and model h as an individual specific, time invariant, effect. 
We augment the Mincerian earnings function with a range of observable firm-level variables,   3 
summarised by a vector f, and a firm specific fixed effect t which is unobserved. Adding a time effect 
qt and a residual  ijt n we hence write our baseline earnings function as 
[1]  ijt j i t jt i ijt f h y n t h q g y + + + + ￿ + ￿ = , 
where y denotes the logarithm of the wage, y, g and are parameters to be estimated and i, j, t denote 
employee, firm and time respectively.  
Much recent research on firm characteristics and wages has focussed on the role of firm size, 
seeking to explain why large firms pay higher wages than small firms. Numerous explanations have 
been suggested in various strands of the labour economics literature. The most influential theory has 
been the human capital model, where the common factor in many of the arguments drawn is that firm 
size will be correlated with some dimension of worker quality. Hamermesh (1980, 1993) argues that if 
physical and human capital are complements in the production process, then the most skilled workers 
will be employed by the largest firms. Kremer (1993) and Kremer and Maskin (1996) propose that 
there are advantages to matching high-skill workers with other high-skill workers, and that there are 
fixed costs (i.e. decreasing average costs) to hiring skilled workers. Because large firms can absorb the 
fixed costs they are more likely to match high-skill workers. In a similar vein, Dunne and Schmitz 
(1992) argue that there is a complementarity between the degree of sophistication of physical capital 
and the skill of workers, and that large firms have larger amounts of output over which to amortize the 
fixed costs associated with adopting sophisticated capital. Brown and Medoff (1989) suggest that 
firms that pay their workers more are more likely to survive and grow - such workers presumably 
being better motivated. All these hypotheses have in common that some aspect of the skills or quality 
of the workforce is not adequately controlled for in the regression.  
  Other theories have predicted a size-wage relationship resulting not from omitted skills, but 
for reasons to do with the working conditions inside the firm or the way the firm is managed. 
Efficiency wage models suggest that because monitoring is more expensive in large than in small 
firms, large firms pay higher wages in order to motivate their workers not to shirk, Bulow and 
Summers (1986). Doeringer and Piore (1971) put forward a theory of internal labour markets, where 
as internal recruitment is less costly than hiring outsiders, large firms are willing to pay wage   4 
premiums to workers at low levels in the hierarchy in order to retain a sufficiently large pool of 
potential workers to consider for promotion. Masters (1969) argue that there are compensating wage 
differentials. Working conditions in larger firms are worse than in smaller ones, so workers must be 
compensated.  
Bargaining models have been less concerned with explaining the relationship between firm 
size and wages and have instead focused on showing that firm profits enter the wage equation.  
However as larger firms may be more profitable it is clearly possible that the firm size effect is 
proxying profits.  
These potential explanations provide us with a set of firm variables whose omission might be 
the reason for the observed size-earnings relation. The firm-level variables - the arguments of the f 
vector of the Mincerian earnings function – that we propose to include in the regression are the log of 
the capital labour ratio, in order to control for the capital-skill complementarity hypothesis; the log of 
labour productivity, to control for unobserved productivity of workers (and possibly rent sharing); 
profits per employee, the variable most directly implied by the rent sharing hypothesis; firm age, as 
suggested by Brown and Medoff (1989); the average education in the firm, to allow for matching of 
skilled workers in large firms; and, finally, the proportion of managers and supervisors in the work 
place, the variables related to monitoring costs as hypothesised by the efficiency wage models. 
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is a time 
effect that varies by the order of differencing s.
1 Notice that the differencing wipes out all time-
invariant observable variables, e.g. education, and that to the extent that there are age or tenure effects, 
these will now be absorbed in the time effect. Although the differencing procedure eliminates all time 
invariant unobserved factors that potentially affect earnings, e.g. time invariant cognitive skills or 
                                                 
1 That is, D1Xt = Xt - Xt-1; D2Xt = Xt - Xt-2; and so on.    5 
personality factors, it is likely that there remains a correlation between the regressors and the residual. 
We distinguish between four types of bias, and discuss these next.  
The first potential problem is that posed by attrition, caused in this context by the fact that 
some employees leave their employers during the period spanned by the panel. It turns out that for our 
data set, there is considerable attrition (see Section 3), which may create a sample selectivity problem 
if individuals drop out of the sample for reasons that are not entirely random. More precisely, if there 
are unobservable factors determining the probability of attrition that are correlated with unobservable 
factors driving change in earnings, then failure to account for the sample selectivity problem will 
result in biased and inconsistent results.
2 Following Wooldridge (2002) we attempt to test and correct 
for selectivity bias by using a two-stage approach, which is closely related to the model developed by 
Heckman (1976). This approach involves estimating a probit model determining the likelihood that an 
individual observed in the base period will be observed again in future periods, calculating the 
selectivity variable (the inverse Mill’s ratio) and including this as an additional regressor in the wage 
equation. Provided that the model is correctly specified, this approach will give consistent estimates of 
g in the presence of selectivity. Further details of the model are provided in Appendix 1. 
The second possible source of bias is that explanatory variables are almost certainly measured 
with some degree of error. If ignored, measurement errors are expected to cause a downward bias in 
the estimated coefficients. Indeed, if the measurement errors are serially uncorrelated while the true 
but unobserved values of the explanatory variables are slow changing, taking time differences is likely 
to aggravate the measurement error bias. Griliches and Hausman (1986) note that in such a case 
estimators based on ‘long’ differences will be less severely biased than ‘short’ differenced results, and 
we will shortly discuss how we intend to draw on this insight.
3  
The third possible problem is that there are factors unobserved to the econometrician that 
impact both on explanatory variables and on the wage variable. For instance, managers may respond 
                                                 
2 Sample selection may also occur if workers choose which firm size to work in. Idson and Feaster 
(1990) consider this in a cross-sectional setting.  
3 The reason is the signal-to-noise ratio will increase with the length of differencing.    6 
to an unobserved demand shock by raising wages and by investing in physical capital, in which case 
the OLS estimate of the capital coefficient would be upward biased.  
Fourth, it is likely that there is reverse causality in the form of feedback from wages onto both 
employment and capital through the factor demand functions. Clearly, in a standard neoclassical 
model an exogenous positive shock to wages will have a negative effect on employment, holding 
everything else constant, and to the extent that such a shock is unobserved the OLS coefficient on 
employment in the wage equation will be downward biased. By the envelope theorem the positive 
wage shock may have a negative effect on the demand for capital as the marginal profitability of 
capital will be lower for lower levels of employment, see e.g. Denny and Nickell (1992) for a 
derivation of an investment equation in which the coefficient on the wage variable is negative.  
We intend to correct our estimates for the second, third and fourth sources of bias by using 
instrumental variable techniques. To illustrate the approach we begin by generalising [2] 
distinguishing between G = (T-1) + (T-2) +...+ (T-S) equations and allowing for different coefficients 
across the equations: 
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ijT f y n q g ~ ~ ~ ~ + + ￿ = . 
That is, if T = 3 we have two first differenced equations, and one second differenced; if T = 4, there 
will be three first differenced equations, two second differenced equations and one third differenced; 
and so on. One advantage to generalising the model like this is that it becomes straightforward to test 
the restriction inherent in [2] that  ST T g g g g = = = = = ... ... 1 13 12 . If the estimates of different lengths 
differ significantly this suggests that measurement errors are present, particularly if the point estimates 
tend to increase in absolute magnitude with the length of differencing, Griliches and Hausman (1986).   7 
A second advantage is that we can use different instrument sets for different equations in [3]. It is 
likely that for some of the equations in [3] only a small number of instruments are available while for 
other equations the instrument set is richer, and clearly the more instruments that can be exploited, the 
more efficient is the resulting estimator (see e.g. the literature on estimation of dynamic panel data 
models, Arellano and Bond, 1992; Arellano and Bover, 1995; Blundell and Bond, 1998). To estimate 
the parameters we adopt a generalised method of moments (GMM; Hansen, 1982) framework, within 
which we formulate estimators that assume that the residuals are uncorrelated with the regressors, as 
well as estimators that do not rely on this assumption. We outline the GMM framework next. 
Assume that  st q  moment conditions of the form  
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stacked vector of residuals for individual i in firm j, where  ￿ ￿ =
s t st q q  denotes the total number of 
instruments across all equations. Because the differenced residuals in [3] almost certainly are 
correlated with each other, it is efficient to allow for cross-equation correlation of the residuals by 
estimating all equations in [3] simultaneously. Assumed that  k q > , where  k  is the number of 
parameters to be estimated, the GMM estimates obtained from simultaneous estimation of [3] are 
given by 
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similar matrices stacking the individual explanatory variables, and the dependent variable, 
respectively.
4  
For panel data, potentially valid instruments can be found in the set of contemporaneous, 
lagged and lead values of f. We consider moment conditions of the form  
                                                 
4 All the standard regularity conditions (see e.g. Hansen, 1982) are assumed to hold.   8 
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for certain values of the integer t . For OLS estimates of [2] or [3] to be consistent, we require [6a] to 






ijt n ~  are correlated, e.g. for reasons discussed 
above.
5 To illustrate this, consider a case where fjt is correlated with the contemporaneous residual  ijt n , 
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will not hold. However [6b] contains some moment conditions that will hold, e.g. 0 ) ~ ( ) 1 ( , = + -
s
ijt s t ij f E n  
or, for s > 1,  0 ) ~ ( ) 1 ( , = - -
s
ijt s t ij f E n . What moment conditions may hold in practice depends crucially on 
the time series properties of the residuals, and is an empirical question. It is possible that no lagged or 
lead values of f are valid instruments, in which c ase use of external instruments are required for 
consistent estimation.  
  Based on the model outlined above, we adopt a research strategy similar to that suggested by 
Griliches and Hausman (1986), p. 114. We begin by estimating [2] for s = 1, 2,..., S, where S is the 
longest difference available in the data, using OLS. If the estimates of different lengths differ 
significantly this suggests that measurement errors are present, particularly if the point estimates tend 
to increase in absolute magnitude with the length of differencing. To formally investigate whether the 
estimates differ, we estimate [3] imposing  ST T g g g g = = = = = ... ... 1 13 12 , and test for the validity of 
this restriction. We then estimate [3] omitting the moment conditions in [7b], and using as instruments 
lagged and lead values of the explanatory variables. We impose  ST g g = =... 12 , and carry out the 
standard Sargan-Hansen test for the overidentifying restrictions. If the cross-equation restrictions are 
                                                 
5 Given  0 ) ~ ( =
s
t E n , non-zero correlation between   9 
too strong, or if instruments are not valid, then some or all of the sample moments will be significantly 
different from zero, hence signalling misspecification.  
  The data which will be summarised in the next section is a panel of workers who were 
observed for a maximum of six years within a firm. We can therefore use the methodology we have 
summarised in this section we estimate equations of different orders of differencing and to test if the 
effect of firm size on earnings does differ depending on how long is the period of differencing of the 
equation. We can then proceed to use the methods outlined above to generate valid instruments. We 
turn next to describing the data.  
 
3.   Data  
This study uses survey data on manufacturing firms in Ghana and Kenya, collected in face-to-face 
interviews with the firms’ management.
6 The surveys used very similar survey instruments, enabling 
us to carry out comparisons across the countries. Four manufacturing sub-sectors were covered, 
namely food processing, textiles and garments, wood and furniture, and metal-working including 
machinery. These sub-sectors comprise the bulk of manufacturing employment in both countries. Four 
geographical areas in each country were surveyed, and large as well as small firms, including informal 
ones, were included in the sample. At the same time as the firms were surveyed a sample of workers 
and, where applicable, apprentices was chosen from each firm designed to cover the full range of 
personnel employed by the firms.
7 Hence we have matched employer-employee data. For Ghana we 
have data over six years, 1995-2000, while for Kenya we only have two rounds of data, covering 1995 
and 2000.  
After deleting observations with missing values on key variables, a small number of gross 
outliers and apprentices, we obtain a sample of 4,695 observations on Ghanaian employees and 1,910 
observations on Kenyan ones, for which we have complete information on wages and a set of firm-
                                                 
6 One advantage in using data from private manufacturing firms is that wages might better reflect 
productivity unlike the public sector firms where wages may be distorted. This provides a better setting to 
examine role of firm characteristics. 
7 The objective was to have up to 10 workers and 10 apprentices from each firm where firm size 
allowed. To increase the informational content of the data, the worker sample was stratified according to 
occupational status.   10 
level variables. Part A in the Appendix provides details on how the sample was constructed. The 
panel, which is unbalanced, is shown in Table A1 in Appendix 2. The table shows, for instance, that 
70 of the 117 Ghanaian firms first observed in 1995 were observed in 2000; similarly, 52 of the 685 
Ghanaian employees observed for the first time in 1995 were observed again in 2000. Hence there is 
significant attrition from the sample, both for firms and employees, so the sub-samples for which we 
can estimate the earnings equation using higher order differences are quite small. Indeed, fifth 
differences can only be taken for 52 Ghanaian employees and 78 Kenyan employees. These 
observations are possibly the most valuable ones however, as earnings and firm characteristics tend to 
change slowly.  
In our data set the individual time series data will end whenever an individual leaves a firm. 
That is, the data set contains time series data solely on ‘stayers’, as distinct from ‘movers’. While it is 
essential to use data on movers in some applications, e.g. in order to identify a tenure effect while 
controlling for individual fixed effects (see Topel, 1991), this is not the case in our context. In fact, we 
would argue that in order to analyse if a firm variable impacts causally on earnings, there is a case for 
not including data on movers even if such data were available. The reason is that the individual’s 
productivity may differ across firms, and to the extent that this is unobservable and correlated with 
firm variables, the firm coefficients will be biased. Consider a case for instance where the quality of a 
‘match’ between a firm and an individual varies across firms for a given individual. If matching 
quality is observed to the employer and remunerated accordingly, then moving from one firm to 
another will alter the wage if the individual’s matching quality differs across the two firms. This, of 
course, is not a causal effect, but as matching quality typically is unobserved to the econometrician, 
this may bias the coefficients on the firm variables if these are correlated with the quality of the match. 
It is reasonable to assume matching quality to be constant over time within firms, in which case this 
will be absorbed by the fixed effect for stayers.  
Table 1 shows summary statistics for various variables that we will use in the empirical 
analysis, for the Ghanaian and Kenyan sub-samples. We identify two size categories: small, which is 
firms with up to 30 employees, and large those with 31 or more employees. A minor number of 
observations are incomplete in that information on firm age and the individual human capital variables   11 
is missing. This will only affect the OLS levels regressions, as none of these variables are used in the 
differenced regressions. In both countries, the average level of monthly earnings in small firms is 
about USD 50, while in large firms it is more than USD 100, suggesting substantial firm size 
differences in earnings. Looking only at production workers, the average wage in large firms is about 
50 per cent higher than in small firms. It is perfectly possible that this earnings differential reflects 
differences in human capital over the size range, as the average years of education, tenure and age, are 
higher in large than in small firms. Looking at the firm variables it is clear that large firms tend to be 
more capital intensive, older and have a higher labour productivity, than small firms. Kenyan firms 
appear to have a higher capital intensity and labour productivity than their Ghanaian counterparts.  
The central issue with which we are concerned is how the large dispersion of earnings across 
firms of different sizes documented in Table 1 is to be explained. To shed light on this we turn to 
regression analysis, where we intend to use the data in the following way. In the next section we carry 
out two sets of OLS regressions. First, we estimate the levels earnings equation [1] using OLS. This is 
based on the entire sample. Second, we estimate the differenced earnings equation [2] taking first, 
second, third, fourth and fifth differences of the data. As this requires multiple observations on each 
individual, individuals observed only once cannot be included. For Kenya, we can only obtain fifth 
differenced estimates. In section 5 we will implement the instrumental variable GMM estimator that 
combines different orders of differencing. As this estimator requires continuous series of observations 
over time, only the Ghana data are used in this part of the analysis. 
 
4.  Firm Characteristics as Determinants of Earnings: OLS results  
A number of recent studies based on data on African manufacturing firms have shown that individual 
earnings are positively correlated with firm size (e.g. Valenchik, 1997; Strobl and Thornton, 2001; 
Manda, 2002) and that the size effect is larger than that found in developed country data sets (Brown 
and Medoff 1989, Troske 1999 and Bayard and Troske, 1999). While these analyses for African 
manufacturing firms do control for observed heterogeneity in individual human capital, typically 
measured by education, experience and age, none of them control for unobserved ability in the form of 
individual fixed effects. In view of the ‘quality-of-labour’ arguments summarised in Section 2 this is a   12 
potentially serious omission. While our data set does enable us to control for individual fixed effects 
we begin our empirical analysis by reporting earnings equations of the form often used in the 
literature, i.e. using OLS and controlling for observable human capital. This facilitates comparison 
with earlier studies and provides us with a benchmark.  
Table 2 presents the results from estimating [1] for Ghana and Kenya, and separating out 
production workers from others, all under the assumption that any unobserved heterogeneity is 
captured by a residual uncorrelated with regressors. Except for Ghanaian production workers, 
education has a non-linear, convex, effect on earnings, manifesting itself through the significance of 
the squared term. The estimated returns to tenure are low, always less than one per cent, and in all 
cases insignificantly different from zero. The tenure variable is highly correlated with age so it is 
possible that these low tenure effects are partly driven by collinearity. There is some evidence that for 
both Ghana and Kenya, conditional on observable characteristics, women are paid less than men 
among production workers, which may reflect gender bias or productivity differentials. The time 
dummy is positive and statistically significant in all cases, indicating that real earnings have risen over 
the five year period. 
  We now focus on the role of firm variables in the earnings equation. Four results are noted. 
First, the coefficient on labour productivity is positive and significant in all cases. Second, firm age 
and the capital labour ratio are insignificant. Brown and Medoff (2001) also find that the higher wages 
that older firms pay may be fully explained by their workers characteristics. Third, the coefficient on 
average education in the firm ranges between 0.01 and 0.03 and has t-values around one, except in one 
case where it is significant at the five per cent level. Fourth, and most important for our purposes, the 
coefficient on firm size is positive and highly significant. For Kenya it is 0.10, while for Ghana the 
point estimate is 0.16, for all occupations. The point estimates on the size variable is reduced, 
particularly for Kenya, if the sample is confined to production workers. The size effect documented in 
Table 2 is not due to the omission of the other firm characteristics which it has been suggested the firm 
size variable might be proxying.  
The manner of proceeding in Table 2 is similar to the method adopted by Troske (1999) and 
Bayard and Troske (1999). We have asked if firm characteristics, which may be related to the skills of   13 
the workforce, can explain the size effect. Like them we find they cannot. There remains the 
possibility that the size effect is due to the unobserved ability of workers or the unobserved 
characteristics of the workplace. Troske (1999, p. 25) notes that “one possible explanation that is 
consistent with the results reported in this paper is that large employers hire better workers and that 
both large employers and their employees are more likely to invest in firm-specific human capital”. It 
is noted that between 47 and 70 per cent of the variation in earnings remains unexplained, and it seems 
very likely that a substantial share of this variation is due to unobserved factors rather than simply 
measurement errors in the earnings variable. We therefore continue by controlling for individual fixed 
effects by differencing the data. In doing so we now control for all the time invariant characteristics of 
the worker and the firm. 
Table 3 reports the results from estimating differenced earnings equations. In Columns [1] –
[5] we show for Ghana the estimates using first to fifth differences. In Column [6] we show the result 
for fifth differences of the Kenya data. In Column [7] we report a pooled estimate for the fifth 
differences of both Ghana and Kenya, and in Column [8] we include as an additional regressor a 
selectivity correction term based on a probit modelling attrition. The equation in the top part of the 
table simply reports the results of regressing the change of log earnings on the change of log 
employment. The second equation includes the same firm regressors as were used in Table 2. For 
reasons already discussed we believe the point estimates of the coefficients will rise as the orders of 
differencing increases. As we wish to compare Ghana and Kenya we focus in this section simply on 
the fifth difference on the grounds that this is where we expect measurement error bias to be least 
severe, and where a direct comparison is possible across the two countries. In the next section we will 
consider the additional uses to which the Ghana data can be put. 
We consider first the equation which models the change in earnings as a function of the 
change in the log of employment for the fifth differences for Ghana and Kenya [Table 3, Columns (5) 
and (6)]. The point estimate for the coefficient on size is virtually identical for the two countries at 
0.11 and 0.10 respectively. Neither is significant at the 10 per cent level reflecting the small sample 
size that we have for fifth differences. In Table 3 Column [7] the two countries are pooled (pooling is 
clearly accepted) and the estimated coefficient of 0.10 is now significant at the five per cent level.    14 
Remarkably, this estimated coefficient is only slightly below the simple average for the two countries 
from the Table 2 results.  
We turn now to consider the general specification of the differenced equations reported in the 
bottom p art of Table 3. We augment the differenced earnings function with the additional firm 
variables considered in Table 2, i.e. the average level of education in the firm, the log of the capital 
labour ratio, the log of output per employee, the proportion of managers in the firm, the proportion of 
supervisors in the firm, and profits per employee, all differenced.
8 The estimated coefficient on labour 
productivity is equal to 0.03, which is much smaller than in the regressions reported in Table 2, and 
insignificant, which is consistent with the notion that unobserved ability of individuals is positively 
correlated with productivity, Bayard and Troske (1999). That is, once we control for unobserved 
ability in the form of individual fixed effects the earnings-productivity relation vanishes. Average 
education in the firm, however, has a positive and significant effect on earnings. The point estimate is 
0.03, indicating that a one-year increase in the average level of education in the firm is associated with 
a rise in individual earnings of about 3 per cent. Just as in the OLS regressions in Table 2, the 
inclusion of the additional variables does not reduce the coefficient on the size variable. In fact, the 
estimated size coefficient increases to 0.24, which appears to be driven by a relatively large, but 
imprecise estimate of the capital labour ratio coefficient. Equally striking is that for the Ghana only 
data reported in columns [1]-[4], with lower levels of differencing, the point estimate now varies from 
0.10 to 0.26, and using either second or third differences is significant at the one per cent level. The 
results in Table 3 also show that the point estimate on employment is robust to the inclusion of a range 
of other firm level variables. It appears that the size  effect is not being driven by either the 
unobservable skills of the workers or the unobserved characteristics of the work place, nor is it a proxy 
for a productivity or capital intensity effect. 
  We noted above that one of the disadvantages of the five year differenced model is that 
attrition will be significant. We now address that problem following the approach outlined in Section 
2. We assume that the probability that an individual will not drop out is a function of education, years 
                                                 
8 Obviously firm age cannot be included once we difference the equation as there will be no cross-
section variation in the variable.   15 
of tenure, age (allowing for a quadratic effect), gender, firm size, firm age, profit per employee, the 
log of the capital labour ratio, the log of output per employee and the average level of education in the 
firm. Experimentation with the data indicated that the some of the coefficients differed across the two 
countries, so we allow for country specific effects by interacting the country dummy with each of the 
regressors. The resulting probit regression (not reported) is highly significant, which is important in 
order to obtain precise estimates of the coefficients in the differenced earnings equation.
9 Based on 
this, Column [8] reports the selectivity corrected differenced earnings equation. The coefficient on the 
inverse Mill’s ratio (lambda) is positive and significant, indicating that the attrition if ignored will lead 
to selectivity bias.
10 The result may imply that unobserved factor(s) that increase the probability of 
exiting the firm are also positively correlated with change in earnings. The estimated firm size 
coefficient is 0.12 in the bivariate specification, hence marginally higher than previously, and is now 
significant at the five per cent level. In the full specification the point estimate on employment is 
unaffected by the inclusion of the lamda term.  
 
5.  Simultaneity and Fixed Effects: GMM Results   
So far we have followed a common path in the literature in investigating the firm-size earnings 
relationship. Like many others we have found that the size variable cannot be eliminated by controls 
for other aspects of the firm. In the last section we went further than is possible in most other studies 
and showed that the firm size effect survives if we allow for unobserved, time invariant, heterogeneity 
in the workers and the workplace. In this section we test whether we can identify an effect from size 
onto earnings while allowing the explanatory variables to be correlated with the residual, potentially as 
a result of measurement errors or endogeneity. Our method is to use the Ghana data where, as we have 
six years of annual data, we can create instruments by exploiting the moment conditions implied by 
the different orders of differencing the data as discussed in Section 2. 
                                                 
9 Because we are fortunate to have numerous variables in our probit model that do not enter the second 
stage regression, the estimated Mill’s ratio and the regressors in the earnings function are only weakly correlated. 
It is well known that when they are highly correlated, which typically happens when the exclusion restrictions 
are too few or inadequate, the parameter estimates in the selectivity corrected equation are likely to be very 
imprecise (see e.g. Leung and Yu, 1996). 
10 The estimate of the correlation coefficient r is about 0.60.   16 
  Table 4 provides our tests where we combine all the possible levels of differencing from our 
data set to allow for all individual and firm fixed characteristics and to provide us with a set of 
instruments. Because we have up to 6 time periods, our system consists of 15 equations across which 
we impose common coefficients. In Columns [1] and [2] we report one-step GMM results based on 
the moment conditions in [7], valid only if the explanatory variables are  not correlated with the 
residual.
11 These specifications can hence be viewed as restricted versions of the models reported in 
Table 3, as the moment conditions are the same as in Table 3 but more cross-equation restrictions are 
imposed here.  
Column [1] shows the results from a simple specification where earnings depends only on 
employment. The estimated employment coefficient is equal to 0.04, and insignificant at conventional 
levels. There is strong evidence that the model is misspecified, as indicated by the general Sargan-
Hansen test. This is not surprising as we know from Table 3 that the point estimates vary considerably 
with the length of differencing, hence imposing a common coefficient across the 15 equations is bound 
to be invalid. As expected there is evidence that the results based on the first differenced equations are 
significantly different from those of longer differences. 
Column [2] shows the full specification used in Table 3, again estimated under the assumption 
that explanatory variables are not correlated with the residual. The Sargan-Hansen specification test 
suggests that we can accept the specification, however the narrower test for pooling of first and higher 
order differenced equations indicates that we can reject pooling at the five per cent level. The 
estimated coefficient on the capital-labour ratio is 0.07, rather higher than what we obtained in the 
levels equations estimated by OLS (see Table 2). With a t-statistic of 1.56 the coefficient is not all that 
far from significant at the 10 per cent level. The point estimate of the employment coefficient 
increases to 0.11, but this is entirely driven by the inclusion of the capital-labour ratio. The marginal 
effect of employment, holding everything else constant, is still about 0.04 and insignificantly different 
                                                 
11 To obtain one-step results we follow the suggestion of Arellano and Bond (1991) and define the weight matrix 
W to reflect the correlation of the differenced residual across equations, see appendix. We focus on the one-step 
results in view of the well-known problem with the two-step estimator that the resulting asymptotic standard 
errors typically will be downward biased in finite samples, potentially giving rise to misleading inference (see 
Arellano and Bond, 1991). The two-step results, available on request from the authors, are very much the same 
as the one-step results except that the standard errors are rather much lower.    17 
from zero. Contrary to the finding in Table 2 the coefficient on profit per employee is positive and 
significant, hence it seems the inclusion of fixed effects reduces the magnitude of the downward bias 
somewhat. Average education is positive and quite close to significant at the 10 per cent level. Our 
proxy variables for the monitoring technology, i.e. the proportion of managers, and supervisors, of the 
total workforce, are both significant at the ten per cent level. The coefficient on supervisors, however, 
is positive which is at odds with the theoretical prediction that firms substitute more monitoring for 
higher wages in order to motivate their workers. The coefficient on the proportion of managers is 
negative. 
Perhaps the main finding in Columns [1] and [2] is that a pooled specification based on the 
assumption that the regressors are uncorrelated with the residuals is rejected by the data. In particular 
there is evidence that coefficients are not stable across first and higher order differenced equations, 
which is consistent with explanatory variables being measured with errors, Griliches and Hausman 
(1986). In the remaining columns of the table all regressors are treated as endogenous, hence we do 
not use the moment conditions in [7] instead we use lagged and lead values as instruments. This 
procedure addresses not only the problem posed by measurement errors but also the  endogeneity 
problem in general. The former problem is likely to be most serious for the capital stock series. Details 
of the instrument sets are shown in the table notes.  
In Column [3] we take earnings to depend only on employment. The resulting coefficient on 
employment is equal to 0.17 and significant at the five per cent level. This estimate is higher than that 
reported in Column [1], which is to be expected if employment is measured with error or there is 
reverse causality in the form of an exogenous p ositive wage shock impacting negatively on 
employment. To shed light on the role of additional variables, we report the full specification in 
Column [4]. Compared to previous models we obtain a dramatic increase in the point estimate of the 
coefficient on the capital-labour ratio, now equal to 0.24 and significant at the five per cent level. The 
estimated coefficient on employment is 0.36, and, given the coefficients on the capital-labour ratio and 
output per employee, the marginal effect of employment is equal to (0.36 – 0.24 + 0.01) = 0.12, which 
is lower than in Column [3], and significant at the ten per cent level (test not reported). We note that 
the coefficient on output per employee is close to zero and far from significant.    18 
Compared to Column [2] we obtain an increase in the coefficient on profit per employee, now 
significant at the one per cent level. The point estimate of 0.03 corresponds to an elasticity of wages 
with respect to profit per employee of about 0.04, evaluated at the sample mean of profits per 
employee. This is somewhat lower than what has been found in studies of the US labour market, 
Blanchflower et al. (1996), and much lower than what Teal (1996) reports for Ghana 1991-93 based 
on instrumented regressions. The coefficient on the proportion of managers is negative and significant, 
consistent with efficiency wage theory. The point estimate of –0.71 is interpretable as a semi-elasticity 
of wages with respect to the proportion of managers: an increase by 0.01 in the manager-employee 
ratio is expected to decrease wages by 0.71 per cent. The coefficients on average education and the 
proportion of supervisors are both positive but insignificant at conventional levels. Finally, both the 
general Sargan-Hansen test and the test for pooling of first and higher order differenced equations 
indicate that we can accept the model specification.
12  
In Column [5] we report a parsimonious version of the general specification, where we 
exclude output per employee, education and the proportion of supervisors from the model on the 
grounds that the associated coefficients are insignificant in Column [4]. The instrument set is 
unchanged. The results do not change much. The estimated capital coefficient increases marginally to 
0.27, and is now significant at the one per cent level. Employment has an estimated coefficient equal 
to 0.39, implying a marginal effect of 0.12 which is significant at the ten per cent level (test not 
                                                 
12 It is well known that the Sargan-Hansen has low power when the number of overidentifying restrictions is 
high (Bowsher (2000)). This is reflected in Column [4] by the p-value tending to unity. We can distinguish 
between two sources of restrictions imposed on the model: on the one hand the cross-equation restrictions; on 
the other hand the exclusion restrictions imposed on the instruments i.e. that lagged and lead values of the 
explanatory variables do not enter the structural equation. The validity of all these restrictions are tested for at 
the same time by the general test, and because the total number of restrictions is high the power of the test is 
likely to be low. Our test for pooling of first and higher order differenced equations, which has only seven 
degrees of freedom and is thus unlikely to suffer from low power, suggests that the cross-equation restrictions 
are not overly restrictive (the p-value is 0.75). In Column [4] 98 of the overidentifying restrictions result from 
the cross-equation restrictions. To assess whether the exclusion restrictions imposed on the instruments are valid, 
consider generalising the model so that no cross-equation restrictions are imposed. In this case there would be 
203 – 98 = 105 overidentifying restrictions all of which result from the exclusion restrictions imposed on the 
instruments. Clearly an upper bound on the Sargan-Hansen J -statistic in such a model would be the value 
reported in Column [4], i.e. 96.85. With 105 degrees of freedom we would still comfortably accept the validity 
of the overidentifying restrictions. The second test for overidentifying restrictions shown in Table 4 (indicated 
with a superscript (b)) reports the Sargan-Hansen J-statistic obtained in a model where 70 of the 98 cross-
equation restrictions are relaxed.  For the specification in Column [4] the J-statistic decreases to 37.6, which is 
well below the critical value at any level of significance with 133 degrees of freedom. This suggests that the 
exclusion restrictions imposed on the instruments are valid.   19 
reported). The coefficient associated with the proportion of managers is somewhat closer to zero than 
previously, and is no longer significant at the ten per cent level. There is no change in the coefficient 
on profit per employee, which is still significant at the one per cent level. In Column [6] we investigate 
if the results are robust to an alternative instrument set in which output per employee, education and 
the proportion of supervisors have been excluded. The coefficients on employment, capital and profit 
per employee are identical to those shown in Column [5], however the manager ratio has a smaller 
effect than previously and the t-value is just above one so the coefficient is not significant. There is no 
evidence from the specification tests that the models in Columns [4] and [5] are misspecified. 
We next investigate the possibility that our results are being biased by attrition. In Table 3 we 
obtained a significant coefficient on the selectivity variable, but found that this had a very small effect 
on the point estimates of interest. Because attrition bias technically is a form of omitted variables bias, 
we would expect our instrumental variable results shown in Table 4 to be robust to such problems. To 
assess whether this indeed is the case, we take a closer look at the equations that can only be estimated 
for the arguably atypical sub-sample for which we have a full set of six observations over time. 
Specifically, we carry out Wald tests of the null hypothesis that the coefficients in these equations are 
the same as the coefficients in the other equations. Test results are shown at the bottom of Table 4. In 
no case can we reject common coefficients across these equations. We conclude that attrition bias is 
not a significant problem.  
The only dimension of skills for which we have not so far controlled is unobserved time 
varying worker quality. While possible in principle, it seems to us rather unlikely such an effect is 
driving our results. Even if the changes in unobserved quality were correlated with changes in 
employment, capital and profits, we would expect our instruments to correct for the resulting 
simultaneity. If the instruments failed to do so, we would expect our tests to indicate that the model is 
misspecified. There is no evidence that this is the case. 
The main finding documented in Table 4 is that both size and profits per employee appear to 
have a causal effect on earnings. There is some, but weaker, evidence that the monitoring technology 
as modelled by the proportion of mangers in the firm also affect earnings. Of course all these variables 
are either choice variables (employment, capital and the number of managers) or functions of choice   20 
variables (profits), so the implication of our results is that a change in an underlying (exogenous) 
factor affecting these endogenous variables will feed into a causal effect on earnings. That is, if a firm 
(for one reason or another) chooses to increase, say, its capital stock by one per cent, then this will 
increase individual earnings by about 0.25 per cent, everything else equal. This result contrasts 
significantly with the interpretation of the size-wage relation in the human capital model, namely that 
workers in large firms are paid more because they are more skilled. In the next section we discuss 
whether efficiency wage and bargaining models can be formulated to be consistent with these 
empirical results. 
 
6.  Models of Non-Competitive Factors Markets and Firm Size  
We have argued that the firm size effect is not due to the unobserved quality of the workers nor is it 
proxying aspects of firm performance such as productivity, the capital labour ratio or firm 
profitability. We now consider if the theories developed to investigate non-competitive labour markets 
can predict a causal relationship from size and profits per employee onto wages. Our model draws on 
two broad classes of theories, the first those which have modelled labour market outcomes as the 
result of bargaining between firms and their employees (Manning, 1987; Blanchflower et al., 1996; 
van Reenen, 1996), the second being the efficiency wage theory predicting that firms choose higher 
wages as a means of motivating their employees. To illustrate the model, define net profits as 
( ) rK wL eL K AF - - = , p , 
where A is total factor productivity, F is the production function, K is physical capital, e is labour 
effort, L is labour, w is the unit price of labour and r is the unit price of capital. The firm and the 
employees bargain over w and L such that the solution is obtained by maximising omega: 
[8]  p f f log ) 1 ( ) ( log max
, ,
- + - = W w w L
w K L
, 
where  f  is the relative bargaining  power of the employees. Provided that workers have some 















,   21 
where  ( ) wL eL K AF
G - = , p  is gross profit, and  w p  is the partial derivative of p  with respect to w.
13 
Efficiency wages implies that w will impact positively on labour effort, hence 
  ( ) g L Le AF L w eL w - ” - = - 1 p . 
Substituting this into [9] and linearising the resulting equation by taking a first order Taylor expansion 

































We can look at the link between the relevant variables and wages by computing log differentials: 
[10]  ( ) ( )









































































and  K a  and  L a  are the output elasticities of capital and labour, respectively.  
Interpreting [10] is not as straightforward as it seems due to the presence of endogenous 
variables. We argued above that there is a causal effect from endogenous variables onto wages, 
ultimately driven by changes in exogenous factors. We now consider the role of two such exogenous 
variables in the wage determination process, namely total factor productivity, A, and the unit price of 
capital, r. It is often argued that these factors are key determinants of the performance of the private 
sector in developing countries.
14 Further, there is typically considerable heterogeneity across firms 
with respect to variables potentially related to  A  and  r, e.g. gross profits per employee, labour 
productivity and capital intensity (see Table 1). We now ask if variation in A or r will feed into 
changes in the endogenous variables of the model that impact on wages, within the framework of the 
                                                 
13 If the employees have no bargaining power, so that  0 = f , then the optimal wage will satisfy  0 = w p . 
14 Pack (1993), for example, stresses the importance of technical capacity in understanding differential firm 
performance.   22 
bargaining cum efficiency wage model outlined above. Even under strongly simplifying structural 
assumptions it is difficult to solve the model analytically, and we therefore use numerical analysis. 
  Table 5 shows how changes in r and A impact on the endogenous variables of interest, in five 
situations. In each case we consider the effect of changing log r and log A by 0.01, and we assume 
throughout the production function to be Cobb-Douglas, with 2 . 0 = K a  and  6 . 0 = L a .
15 Remaining 
parameter values are listed in the table notes. Model [1] assumes a relative bargaining power of 
workers equal to 0.4 and that effort is given by  ( ) ( )
2 1 6 . 1 w w e - = , which follows Sparks (1986).
16 
While an increase in productivity or a decrease in the price of capital increases the size of the firm, 
there is no effect on wages in this model. Hence this form of the non-competitive model, which we can 
take as a benchmark case, does not predict the relationship we observe between firm s ize and 
earnings.
17  
In Models [2] and [3] we adopt a different effort function, derived by Ringuede (1998). 
Ringuede assumes that the probability that a worker will be monitored can be written  ) ( L b , b < L, 
where b is a monitoring efficiency parameter indicating the number of controls that the firm can make 
at a given point in time. Hence workers in large firms are less likely to be monitored than workers in 
small firms (cf. Bulow and Summers, 1986).
18 The effort function, derived from the solution to the 
employee’s utility maximisation problem, is  ( ) ( ) ( )
2 1 6 . 0 b L w w b e + - = . To maintain a given level of 
effort as size increases the firm needs to increase the wage, holding b constant. In Model [2] workers 
have no bargaining power,  0 = f , while in Model [3] we set  4 . 0 = f . In contrast to the benchmark 
model in [1], changes in capital, labour and profit per employee, driven by changes r and A, now 
transmit into changes of wages. In the model without bargaining the elasticity of wages with respect to 
                                                 
15 It is clear from [10] that wages potentially depend on the form of the production function. We adopt the Cobb-
Douglas form here because previous research has shown that this model adequately approximates the nature of 
the technology in Ghanaian manufacturing (Söderbom and Teal, 2002). 
16 The effort function in Sparks is  ( ) ( ) ( )
2 1 1 2 + - = i w w e , where i is the discount rate of the representative 
employee. Hence 1.6 in the denominator corresponds to a discount rate of 30 per cent. 
17 It is well known that when the production function is Cobb-Douglas, revenues per employee will not depend 
on either r or A (MacDonald and Solow, 1981; Abowd and Lemieux, 1993), hence for A to impact on wages, 
such an effect will have to b e transmitted through a changing capital-labour ratio. Similarly, for r to affect 
wages,  1 log / ) / log( - „ r d L K d  is required. 
18 The model can also be derived under the assumption that the firm can alter b, for instance by employing more 
supervisors, see Fafchamps and Söderbom (2002).   23 
the capital-labour ratio is approximately 0.09. Introducing bargaining increases the elasticity to about 
0.13. This form of the model predicts a relationship between size and earnings similar to that we 
observe in the data. 
  Finally in Models [4] and [5] we look at the role of credit constraints. To keep the analysis 
simple we assume that the firm cannot incur capital expenditures in excess of some constant q, so that 
the maximisation problem [8] is subject to the inequality constraint  q £ rK . Model [4] is identical to 
Model [1] except for the introduction of the credit constraint, which is assumed to bind.
19 The results 
show that shocks to r and A do transmit into changes in wages. It is noted that the a decrease in r 
results in higher capital intensity, while an increase in A leads to lower capital intensity. A similar 
result is obtained without efficiency wages. In Model [5] we use Ringuede’s (1998) efficiency wage 
model, where effort depends on size. As expected the wage effects are larger in this model. When r 
changes, the resulting elasticity of the wage with respect to the capital-labour ratio is about 0.20.  
 
7.  Conclusions 
In this paper we have used data from the manufacturing sectors in Ghana and Kenya to investigate if 
firm size affects individual earnings, while controlling for unobserved labour quality in the form of 
employee fixed effects as well as a number of firm characteristics and attrition. We begin by noting 
that the results are entirely consistent with the human capital model in that skills are rewarded in the 
labour market and the fixed effects, interpretable as time invariant skills, are almost always significant 
in the regression reported in Table 2 (tests not reported). The results are not, however, consistent with 
the size effect observed in the cross-section reflecting unobserved ability of the worker or unobserved 
characteristics of the firm. The empirical results in Table 3 indicate that firm characteristics in both 
Kenya and Ghana are important determinants of earnings, when there are controls for fixed effects. 
For the Ghana data we can go one step further and control for the endogeneity of the firm factors 
affecting earnings. The results suggest that firm size, profits per employee and (possibly) the 
proportion of managers causally determine earnings.  
                                                 
19 That is, the Lagrangian multiplier associated with the inequality constraint is strictly larger than zero.   24 
We have developed a model of non-competitive labour markets containing elements drawn 
from both bargaining and efficiency wage models. We have used numerical simulation to show that in 
such a model there is a relationship from firm size to earnings. Further if capital constraints are 
imposed in such a model then the firm-size wage effect increases. Our data is drawn from sub-Saharan 
Africa where such phenomenon are most likely to be found. Whatever the interpretation of the effect 
of size on wages that is advanced we would argue that it is an important determinant of wages and 
cannot be explained by time-invariant characteristics of either the worker or firm, as has been the 
presumption based on the competitive factor market model which underlies the usual interpretation of 
earnings functions.     25 
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TABLE 1: SUMMARY STATISTICS 
  Small firms (employment £ 30)  Large firms (employment > 30) 
  N  Mean  Median  Std. Dev  N  Mean  Median  Std. Dev 
A. GHANA                 
Earnings (all occupations)  1294  53.48  44.06  42.4  3401  121.68  77.57  142.3 
Earnings (production workers)  571  41.24  37.85  21.3  1185  70.14  57.58  52.7 
                 
Employment  1294  16.47  16.00  7.3  3401  177.55  93.00  224.6 
Log [Capital / Labour]  1294  7.36  7.40  1.7  3401  8.60  8.74  1.3 
Log [Output / Labour]  1294  8.19  8.27  0.9  3401  8.72  8.69  1.1 
Average education in firm  1294  10.04  10.39  2.4  3401  11.00  11.21  2.1 
Proportion managers   1294  0.04  0.00  0.1  3401  0.03  0.03  0.0 
Proportion supervisors  1294  0.05  0.00  0.1  3401  0.05  0.04  0.0 
Profit per employee / 1000  1294  0.65  0.38  1.1  3401  1.32  0.86  1.9 
Firm age  1291  18.87  19.00  11.6  3155  21.84  19.00  13.4 
                 
Years of education  1291  10.04  10.00  4.3  3155  12.15  11.00  4.1 
Age  1291  33.91  31.00  11.7  3155  38.54  37.00  10.9 
Years of tenure / 10  1291  0.70  0.40  0.8  3155  0.83  0.60  0.8 
Male proportion   1291  0.76  1.00  0.4  3155  0.87  1.00  0.3 
                 
B. KENYA                 
Earnings (all occupations)  664  54.16  45.57  40.6  1246  106.61  64.25  127.7 
Earnings (production workers)  468  51.22  45.57  29.0  842  76.20  57.02  59.9 
                 
Employment  664  13.34  12.00  8.1  1246  216.40  90.00  355.5 
Log [Capital / Labour]  664  8.23  8.55  1.7  1246  9.40  9.53  1.1 
Log [Output / Labour]  664  8.51  8.55  1.1  1246  9.32  9.26  1.0 
Average education in firm  664  8.38  8.37  1.4  1246  9.56  9.46  1.6 
Proportion managers   664  0.17  0.14  0.1  1246  0.06  0.05  0.0 
Proportion supervisors  664  0.03  0.00  0.1  1246  0.04  0.03  0.0 
Profit per employee / 1000  664  1.48  0.59  3.5  1246  2.72  1.92  3.4 
Firm age  629  21.16  20.00  15.4  1157  24.25  22.00  13.1 
                 
Years of education  629  8.95  8.00  2.8  1157  10.40  11.00  2.8 
Age  629  32.22  30.00  10.1  1157  34.99  34.00  8.8 
Years of tenure / 10  629  0.68  0.40  0.7  1157  0.86  0.60  0.7 
Male proportion   629  0.85  1.00  0.4  1157  0.83  1.00  0.4 
                 
Note: All financial variables are measured in USD. 
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TABLE 2: OLS EARNINGS FUNCTION ESTIMATES WITH FIRM VARIABLES 
  A. All Occupations  B. Production Workers 
  [1] Ghana  [2] Kenya  [3] Ghana  [4] Kenya 
          Years of Education   0.001  -0.10  0.01  -0.04 
  (0.13)  (4.84)**  (0.53)  (1.74) 
          Education 
2 / 100  0.27  0.97  0.04  0.41 
  (5.51)**  (7.57)**  (0.57)  (3.05)** 
          Years of Tenure / 10  0.02  -0.01  0.04  0.03 
  (0.69)  (0.36)  (1.33)  (1.06) 
          Age (years)  0.04  0.03  0.02  0.02 
  (4.41)**  (3.09)**  (2.96)**  (1.98)* 
          Age
2 / 100  -0.03  -0.02  -0.02  -0.01 
  (2.42)*  (1.50)  (2.07)*  (0.97) 
          Male  0.13  0.08  0.15  0.17 
  (2.71)**  (1.61)  (3.11)**  (2.86)** 
          Ln Employment  0.16  0.10  0.14  0.05 
  (7.16)**  (4.09)**  (4.78)**  (2.21)* 
          Ln (Capital / Employment)  -0.02  -0.02  0.02  -0.02 
  (1.00)  (0.82)  (0.98)  (1.13) 
          Ln (Output / Employment)  0.17  0.07  0.13  0.07 
  (6.47)**  (2.51)*  (4.08)**  (2.28)* 
          Ln Firm Age  -0.01  0.05  -0.02  0.02 
  (0.22)  (1.26)  (0.37)  (0.48) 
          Average Education in Firm   0.02  0.01  0.03  0.01 
  (1.64)  (0.69)  (2.11)*  (1.00) 
          Proportion Managers  -0.25  0.44  -1.22  0.01 
  (0.59)  (1.76)  (2.26)*  (0.03) 
          Proportion Supervisors  -0.29  -0.24  -0.29  0.07 
  (0.74)  (0.57)  (0.59)  (0.15) 
          Profit per Employee / 1000  -0.007  0.005  -0.01  0.002 
  (0.46)  (0.60)  (0.66)  (0.26) 
                   
         
          Marginal return of 
education at education = 6 
0.03  0.02  0.01  0.01 
Marginal return of 
education at education = 12 
0.07  0.13  0.02  0.06 
                   
R
2  0.53  0.41  0.47  0.30 
Number of Observations  4446  1786  1671  1214 
         
Note: The dependent variable is the logarithm of monthly earnings, expressed in USD. Dummy variables for 
sector, time and location are included in all regressions. The numbers in ( ) are t-statistics based on standard errors 





 TABLE 3: DIFFERENCED EARNINGS EQUATIONS 
  [1] Ghana  [2] Ghana  [3] Ghana  [4] Ghana  [5] Ghana  [6] Kenya  [7] Pooled  [8] Pooled 
Order of differencing:  1  2  3  4  5  5  5  5 
  A. BIVARIATE SPECIFICATION 
                  D Ln Employment  -0.02  0.10  0.17  0.08  0.10  0.11  0.10  0.12 
  (1.04)  (2.76)**  (3.74)**  (1.00)  (1.06)  (1.73)
+  (1.96)
+  (2.26)* 
                  Kenya              0.12  0.14 
              (2.01)*  (2.39)* 
                  Lambda                0.18 
                (1.67)
+ 
                  R-squared  0.19  0.07  0.09  0.06  0.02  0.04  0.06   
                 
  B. FULL SPECIFICATION 
                  D Ln Employment  0.10  0.20  0.27  0.15  0.04  0.23  0.25  0.25 
  (1.24)  (2.25)*  (3.44)**  (0.78)  (0.24)  (3.01)**  (2.86)**  (3.01)** 
                  D Ln (Capital / Employment)  0.12  0.10  0.12  -0.04  -0.18  0.20  0.12  0.11 
  (1.87)
+  (1.37)  (1.65)
+  (0.18)  (1.14)  (4.04)**  (1.97)*  (1.85)
+ 
                  D Ln (Output / Employment)  0.01  -0.03  -0.06  0.12  0.21  -0.07  0.04  0.02 
  (0.43)  (0.89)  (1.58)  (1.20)  (2.08)*  (1.92)
+  (0.78)  (0.52) 
                  D Average Education in Firm  0.00  0.01  0.01  0.03  0.05  0.05  0.03  0.04 
  (0.48)  (0.58)  (0.47)  (1.52)  (3.32)**  (1.82)
+  (2.25)*  (2.51)* 
                  D Proportion Managers  -0.73  -0.47  -0.62  -0.61  -0.22  0.39  0.50  0.51 
  (1.82)
+  (1.21)  (1.75)
+  (0.35)  (0.10)  (0.69)  (0.86)  (0.91) 
                  D Proportion Supervisors  0.48  0.19  0.20  -0.22  0.34  -0.66  0.09  0.10 
  (1.53)  (0.58)  (0.74)  (0.20)  (0.34)  (1.33)  (0.15)  (0.19) 
                  D Profit per Employee / 1000  0.01  0.03  0.03  0.02  -0.03  0.01  0.01  0.01 
  (1.37)  (2.58)*  (2.54)*  (0.39)  (0.47)  (1.68)
+  (0.53)  (0.76) 
                  Kenya              0.14  0.17 
              (2.39)*  (2.81)** 
                  Lambda                0.20 
                (1.86)
+ 
                  R-squared  0.20  0.09  0.12  0.13  0.21  0.18  0.13   
Observations  2493  845  459  105  52  78  130  130 
                  Note: The dependent variable is change in logarithm of earnings. The numbers in ( ) are absolute values of t-statistics. Significance at the 1 per cent, 5 per cent and 10 
per cent level is indicated by **, * and 






TABLE 4: GMM ESTIMATES OF DIFFERENCED EARNINGS EQUATIONS 
             
  [1]  [2]  [3]  [4]  [5]  [6] 
  No allowance for endogeneity  Allowing for endogeneity 
             
D Ln Employment  0.04  0.11  0.17  0.36  0.39  0.39 
  (1.03)  (1.98)
+  (2.38)*  (3.84)**  (3.98)**  (3.87)** 
              D Ln (Capital / Employment)    0.07    0.24  0.27  0.27 
    (1.56)    (2.43)*  (2.72)**  (2.61)** 
              D Ln (Output / Employment)    0.01    -0.01     
    (0.48)    (0.24)     
              D Average Education in Firm    0.01    0.01     
    (1.56)    (1.20)     
              D Proportion Managers    -0.54    -0.71  -0.64  -0.47 
    (1.68)
+    (1.77)
+  (1.55)  (1.09) 
              D Proportion Supervisors    0.47    0.21     
    (2.01)*    (0.74)     
              D Profit per Employee / 1000    0.01    0.03  0.03  0.03 
    (2.33)*    (3.25)**  (3.17)**  (2.76)** 
                           
SPECIFICATION TESTS             
Overidentifying restrictions
(a): J-value  36.50  107.22  26.19  96.85  95.27  66.48 
p-value  0.00  0.25  0.62  1.00  1.00  1.00 
Number of overidentifying restrictions  14  98  29  203  206  116 
             
Overidentifying restrictions
(b): J-value  4.76  31.31  19.94  37.58  62.63  20.13 
p-value  4  0.30  0.40  1.00  1.00  1.00 
Number of overidentifying restrictions  0.31  28  19  133  166  76 
             
First & higher order differences pool: p-value  0.00  0.04  0.53  0.75  0.90  0.92 
             
Attrition: p-value  0.72  0.24  0.40  0.84  0.91  0.74 
             
Observations             
             
Tables notes on following page.  
 
TABLE 4: GMM ESTIMATES OF COMBINED DIFFERENCED EARNINGS EQUATIONS 
Note: The dependent variable is change in logarithm of earnings. The numbers in ( ) are absolute values 
of t-statistics. Significance at the 1 per cent, 5 per cent and 10 per cent level is indicated by **, * and + 
respectively. Time dummies are included in all equations and in all regressions. 




 and time dummies.  
The instrument set for [3]-[6] is as follows: 
s = 1 (first differences):  2 , - t ij f ,  3 , - t ij f  and time dummies. 
s = 2 (second differences):  1 , - t ij f ,  3 , - t ij f  and time dummies. 
s = 3 (third differences):  1 , - t ij f ,  2 , - t ij f  and time dummies. 
s = 4 (fourth differences):  1 , - t ij f ,  2 , - t ij f ,  3 , - t ij f  and time dummies. 
s = 5 (fifth differences):  1 , - t ij f ,  2 , - t ij f ,  3 , - t ij f ,  4 , - t ij f  and time dummies. 
  
 
Table 5  
EFFECTS OF CHANGES IN UNIT PRICE OF CAPITAL AND TOTAL FACTOR PRODUCTIVITY: 
NUMERICAL ANALYSIS 
             
    Dln K x 100  Dln L x 100  Dln K/L x 100  D(p/L) x 100  Dln w x 100 
             
[1]  Dln r  = -0.01  2.00  1.00  1.00  0.00  0.00 
  Dln A =  0.01  5.00  5.00  0.00  0.00  0.00 
             
[2]  Dln r  = -0.01  1.51  0.34  1.16  0.53  0.11 
  Dln A =  0.01  2.52  1.70  0.83  2.68  0.55 
             
[3]  Dln r  = -0.01  1.51  0.33  1.18  0.38  0.15 
  Dln A =  0.01  2.53  1.65  0.88  1.89  0.75 
             
[4]  Dln r  = -0.01  1.00  0.53  0.47  0.08  0.02 
  Dln A =  0.01  0.00  2.65  -2.65  0.42  0.12 
             
[5]  Dln r  = -0.01  1.00  0.24  0.76  0.52  0.15 
  Dln A =  0.01  0.00  1.19  -1.19  2.61  0.72 
             
[1]:  ( ) ( )
2 1 6 . 1 w w e - = , f = 0.4, r = 0.15, A = 4,  1 = w .  
Solution: K = 34.6, L = 7.79, p/L = 0.40, w = 2.27.   
 
[2]:  ( ) ( ) ( )
2 1 6 . 0 b L w w b e + - = , f = 0, r = 0.15, A = 4,  1 = w , b = 0.5.  
Solution: K = 6.74, L = 0.78, p/L = 2.23, w = 2.93.   
 
[3]:  ( ) ( ) ( )
2 1 6 . 0 b L w w b e + - = , f = 0.4, r = 0.15, A = 4,  1 = w , b = 0.5.  
Solution: K = 9.03, L = 0.95, p/L = 1.54, w = 4.17.     
 
[4]:   ( ) ( )
2 1 6 . 1 w w e - = , f = 0.4, r = 0.15, A = 4,  1 = w , 1 £ rK . 
  Solution: K = 6.67, L = 3.84, p/L = 0.64, w = 2.43.     
 
[5]:  ( ) ( ) ( )
2 1 6 . 0 b L w w b e + - = , f = 0.4, r = 0.15, A = 4,  1 = w , 1 £ rK . 




Appendix 1 The Attrition Model 
 
Assume that the probability that individual i in firm j, observed at time s, will be observed 
again at time s+1 can be modelled using a probit model. Letting Sij denote the selection 
indicator, we write the selection equation for time s+1 as 
[3]   ] 0 [ 1 > + = ij ij ij u z S d ,       
where 1[a] is an indicator function equal to 1 if the event a is true and zero otherwise, z is a 
vector of variables determining attrition, d is a vector of coefficients to be estimated and u is a 
normally distributed residual with mean zero and variance equal to one.
20 Sample selectivity 
bias arises if u is correlated with the differenced residual in [2]. To allow for this possibility 
we assume that u and  n D  follow a joint normal distribution where the correlation coefficient 
is denoted r. Under these assumptions, and provided that  jt f is exogenous and selection does 
not depend on  jt f D , it follows that 
[4]  ( ) ( ) d rl q g ij t jt ijt z f w E + D + D ￿ = Dln , 
where  ( ) ( ) ( ) d d f d l ij ij ij z z z F =  is the inverse Mill’s ratio.
21 Because  ( ) d l ij z  is unobserved 
we use a two-stage procedure, first estimating the probit model in order to obtain estimates of 
( ) d l ij z , denoted  ( ) d l l ˆ ˆ
ij ij z = , and then regressing  ijt w ln D  on  jt f D ,  t q D  and  ij l ˆ .  
 
 
                                                 
20 A time subscript on S is redundant since we are only concerned with attrition in one year. 
21 f(.) and F(.) denote the density function, and the cumulative density function, respectively, 






TABLE A1: SAMPLE STRUCTURE 
                 
  Observed:  1995  1996  1997  1998  1999  2000  Total 
                 
Initial observation                 
A. GHANA                 
1995  Firms   117  107  83  83  65  70  525 
  Employees  685  626  116  110  50  52  1639 
1996  Firms     9  5  7  3  5  29 
  Employees    114  18  17  7  6  162 
1997  Firms       37  35  22  21  115 
  Employees      727  685  240  245  1897 
1998  Firms         7  0  0  7 
  Employees        156  20  31  207 
1999  Firms           5  5  10 
  Employees          354  333  687 
2000  Firms             2  2 
  Employees            103  103 
                 
B. KENYA                 
1995  Firms   159          60  219 
  Employees  1010          78  1088 
2000  Firms             106  106 
  Employees            822  822 
                 
 